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ADMISSIBILITY OF FACT OF SUBMISSION
TO LIE DETECTOR TEST*
A NOVEL question in regard to the admissibility of lie detector
evidence was raised in the recent case of Kaminski v. State.' In a trial
for assault with intent to murder, the State was forced to rely on the
testimony of one Newbold, the prosecuting witness, to establish both
the defendants' motives and their presence at the scene of the crime.
Following his cross-examination, which was at variance with the testi-
mony of other witnesses for the State, the State sought to rehabilitate
Newbold's direct testimony. Pursuant to this objective, he was asked
in the course of redirect examination whether he had taken a lie de-
tector test prior to trial. An objection to this question was made and
overruled with permission being given to either side to introduce the
results of the test. After Newbold acknowledged having taken the
test, however, neither the State nor the defense sought to introduce its
results. The defendants were convicted. On appeal the verdict was
affirmed, but upon rehearing it was reversed on the ground that it was
error to admit evidence that the prosecuting witness had taken a lie
detector test.
Results of lie detector tests have uniformly been denied admission
into evidence by courts of appeal,2 with only rare exceptions to be
found in the lower courts.3 Principally, this evidence is rejected on
*Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1953).
'63 So.zd 339 (Fla. 1953).
2Frye v. U.S., 293 Fed. 1oi3, 34. A.L.R. 145 (D.C. Cir. 1923)5 People v.
Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (195o); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan.
62z, 185 P.2d 147 (947)5 Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 6o6, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951)
(inadmissible even in civil case); People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503,
139 A.L.R. 1171 (194) ; State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.zd 458 (I952)5
State v. Cole, 354 Mo. x81, i88 S.W.2d 43, 189 S.W.2d 541 (i94.s) Boeche v.
State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.zd 593 (949) People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, IS
N.E.2d 31, xi9 A.L.R. 1198 (i939); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 86o, 46 N.W.zd 508
( 195o) Leeks v. State, 245 P.2d 764 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952) 5 Henderson v. State,
230 P.2d 495, 23 A.L.R.2d 1292 (Okla. Crim. App. 195)5 Peterson v. State, 247
S.W.2d io (Tex. Crim. App. 1952); Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.zd
288 (194-3) ; State v. Bohner, 2io Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314, 86 A.L.R. 6xi (1933);
2o AM. JUg., Evidence § 762 (1939) ; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 999 ( 3 d ed. 194o).
'People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens Co. Ct. 1938) (lie
detector evidence admissible where proper foundation laid as to the accuracy of device,
expert witness testifying as to infallibility of his lie detector.) See, however, Inbau,
The Lie Detector, 26 B.U.L. REv. 264, 268 (1946), according a lesser degree of
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grounds that the reliability of the lie detector has not attained sufficient
recognition among scientists.4 Thus, if either party in the Kaminski
case had taken full advantage of the court's ruling by seeking to intro-
duce into evidence the results of the test, their admission over objection
would have been held error in the courts of last resort in all juris-
dictions which have passed on the question.
In the principal case, as has been noted, however, the State made
no effort to introduce the results of the test, but merely endeavored
to show that a test had been taken. The inference probably intended
to be drawn from this fact was that Newbold would not have submitted
voluntarily to the test had he not been veracious, and that his direct
testimony, therefore, was credible despite the subsequent conflicting
testimony presented by the state. Any such inference undoubtedly
would be reinforced by failure of the defendants to introduce the re-
sults of the test.
This appears to be the first case in which an appellate court has
ruled on the admissibility of the bare fact, as distinguished from the
results, of a lie detector test, offered for the purpose of sustaining the
credibility of a witness.' Although strong arguments have been ad-
accuracy to the instrument. In People v. Forte, supra note 2, the New York Court of
Appeals ruled lie detector evidence inadmissible. See also, People v. Houser, 85 Cal.
App. 686, 193 P.2d 937 (x948). (defendant who had agreed to take test and admit
results and who had stipulated that operator was an expert estopped to deny admissi-
bility.)
"This was the view of the court in Frye v. United States, note 3 supra, the first
case involving lie detector evidence, wherein the court said: "We think the systolic
blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition
among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in ad-
mitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments
thus far made." 293 Fed. 1013, 1014, 34 A.L.R. 145, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For
an extensive discussion of this point in a recent case, see Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d
495, 23 A.L.R.zd 1292 (Okla. Crim. App. 195i).
One of the leading experts in this field, Professor Inbau, accords an accuracy of
about seventy-five percent to the lie detector. Inbau, The Lie Detector, 26 B.U.L.REv.
264, 268 (1946). For a survey of both legal and scientific aspects of lie detection,
see INBAu, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (2d ed. 1948). A bibliog-
raphy of material on lie detection prior to 1943 may be found in Note, 1943 Wis. L.
REV. 430, 444.
An analogous question was raised, however, in a recent Minnesota case where
the appellate court held that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce
evidence that the defendant had refused to take a lie detector test as evincing his
consciousness of guilt. State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (195'),
in which the court relied on People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 7o
(1950), which held that the results of such tests were not admissible indirectly in an
accusatory statement by a police officer to the effect that the lie detector indicated a
violent reaction when defendant was confronted with the murder weapon.
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vanced for admitting the results of lie detector tests,6 if the rationale
of the courts in rejecting them7 is accepted, it would seem equally
applicable where the admissibility of the mere fact of taking the test is
in issue. It is improbable that any jury which hears evidence that
a party or witness has submitted to a lie detector test will fail to draw
some inference as to its results, no matter how vehement the court's
cautionary instruction. If the courts will not receive the results of lie
detector tests in evidence because of uncertainty as to their scientific
reliability, they should not encourage juries to infer these results.
Indeed, compounding the danger of the unreliability of these results
would be the danger that juries would draw incorrect and unwarranted
inferences therefrom. As a matter of logical consistency, therefore,
the decision of the appellate court in this case was both inevitable and
proper.
S. PERRY KEZIAH
' The most frequent argument in support of admission of lie detector evidence is
that where a proper foundation as to the efficacy and limitations of the instrument has
been laid, the jury should be allowed to weigh these results along with other evidence
bearing upon the guilt or innocence of a defendant. See the concurring opinion in
Boeche v. State, x5 Neb. 368, 378, 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949). See also People
v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 34.8 (Queens Co. Ct. 1938 ) . Several unreported
cases in which lie detector evidence was admitted have been noted in Note, 19t3 Wis.
L. REV. 430.
7Supra note 4.
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